This paper argues that the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities)
Regulations 2014 1 are fatally flawed. This criticism is often levelled at knee-jerk responses to policy crises created without the benefit of time and thought. Yet, these
Regulations were the product of a sensitively executed public inquiry. I argue that the 2014 Regulations will fail because they rely too heavily on the rhetoric of criminal law while failing to take into account the competing norms for compliance and the impact of NHS budget constraints. They push the CQC towards a deterrence approach to enforcement, increasing hostility between regulatees and inspectors, and ultimately reducing the scope for developing the transparency about failures which is sorely needed in the NHS. This paper challenges the contemporary wisdom that it is primarily knee-jerk regulatory responses that suffer from fatal flaws of this nature.
(A) The 2014 Regulations
The 2014 Regulations enact the 'fundamental standards of minimum safety and quality' 2 recommended by the Francis inquiry into the Stafford Hospital fiasco in the 2010s. This framework of standards is to be met by health and social care providers in England and Wales. Their aim is to protect the dignity of service users while ensuring a high level of safety across health and social care services. The 2014
Regulations encompass twelve minimum standards covering fourteen 'regulated activities'. These activities make up the business of healthcare provision, including personal care; accommodation for persons requiring nursing or personal care; accommodation for persons requiring treatment for substance abuse; treatment of disease, disorder or injury; assessment or medical treatment for persons detained 4 difficult for the CQC to prosecute. The 2014 Regulations appear to have addressed the problem by removing these practical barriers.
(B) The Mid Staffordshire fiasco
Identifying a policy fiasco is difficult to do with certainty. 18 On any measure however, the events at Stafford Hospital were a policy fiasco. The regulatory framework had failed to identify the substandard care at Stafford Hospital, which caused deaths and significant harm. Specifically, while the Healthcare Commission 23 was commended for its 2009 review identifying the problems, it was also criticised for its lack of independence from the Department of Health, its reliance on self-reporting in annual health checks of providers and its willingness to rely on assurances from the NHS Trust. 24 One problem was the 'confusing mixture' 25 of applicable standards encompassing several different and conflicting concepts. Francis criticised the CQC for 'over-bureaucratic' guidance which 'fail [ed] to separate clearly what is absolutely essential from that which is merely desirable'. 26 The situation at Stafford Hospital was highly complex. It implicated individuals at four different levels, caregivers, managers, supervisors and regulators. It further implicated the regulatory system itself. Failures can -and dohappen at all of these levels. Successful regulation must recognise and address failings across all these stages.
Crises are important for analysing regulatory change because they can punctuate the incremental nature of policy development, and lead to dramatic organisational changes. 27 One risk of regulating in crisis management mode is that it can result in 'knee-jerk responses' that leave 'cumbersome and inappropriate regulatory 23 The predecessor body to the CQC. 24 Francis, note 2, 55 25 Francis, note 2, 54 26 Francis, note 2, 58 27 A Boin and 't Hart P, 'Public leadership in times of crisis: Mission impossible? ' (2003) 63
Public Administration Review 544-553; M Lodge and Hood C, 'Pavlovian policy responses to media feeding frenzies? Dangerous dogs regulation. ' (2002) 74 An expression of 'genuine regret, responsibility and intention to change can only be generated by the person concerned'. 75 Power comes from the personal connection, from the patient's understanding of the doctor's remorse, and from the doctor internalising that remorse. Mandating individual apologies undermines, and ultimately removes, the essential characteristic of genuineness. It undermines the patient-doctor relationship of trust and confidence. Where candour policies require an individual to make the apology, it is essential that the institution clarifies the limits of the relationship, and that the apologiser is authorised to and is explicitly acting on behalf of the institution, rather than in a personal capacity.
The rest of the provision focusing on openness, transparency and honesty in communicating about failures, could do real good. A statutory duty to inform patients about failures is easy to fulfil, despite historical evidence to the contrary. The difficult part is taking responsibility. Giving factual information to patients promptly and honestly empowers them to make decisions about the future. It engenders trust in healthcare professionals as human beings since it reminds us that things go wrong.
Lopez et al showed that disclosure of errors led to higher quality ratings of care. It is punishable by a fine not exceeding £50,000 after summary conviction.
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Hospital food provision is a useful context to explore this new offence. Regulation 14
provides that 'the nutritional and hydration needs of service users must be met'.
Needs are defined as: Arguably, there is a difference between a strict Muslim choosing only to consume
Halal food, and a non-religious person choosing not to eat tomatoes. The religious rule appears to give the food preference greater weight. Reasonableness could be used to distinguish between them, such that preferences based in religious or cultural values are more likely to be considered reasonable than preferences which are not. However, food preferences also depend on taste. There is variation in the range of foods that people like, and it might not be unreasonable for a person to choose only to eat food that they enjoy.
There is significant room for manoeuvre within the definition of 'nutritional and hydration needs'. Given this level of uncertainty, it is unclear whether it would be practically possible to find a breach of these standards, let alone prosecute. On its face, the new offence relating to food provision is more stringent than the 2010 offence. It carries a more significant penalty, and it is easier to bring a prosecution.
However, the scope for considerable variation in interpreting the standards themselves is a concern. In the first instance, CQC inspections will establish the boundaries of the standards. A legal ruling will only be possible if a prosecution is brought, and a point of law is appealed to the High Court from the magistrates' decision. This seems unlikely. 
(B) The criminal law
What is the purpose of invoking the criminal law to regulate healthcare provision?
Francis seeks 'a relentless focus on the patient's interests and the obligation to keep patients safe and protected from substandard care'. can for the money they have available, and this might mean cutting expenditure on food, to spend more on cardiac surgery. The obvious way to do this is to contract out.
Contracts should effectively deal with the quality standards. Where the service fails to meet the terms, the institution would have an action in contract against the contractor. If there were a real prospect of CQC enforcement it would weigh in the balance in the compromise between high-quality services and cost-saving. Where there are these competing imperatives, the regulatory framework must provide a stark minimum level that must be met, and if it is to have any effect on the decisions made, it must limit, through the potential for enforcement action, the power that the imperative to cost-save has in any calculation. Regulation 14 fails to do that.
The interplay of norms surrounding the duty of candour is different. The social approval of openness and transparency about errors, and the social disapproval of secrecy expressed by regulation 20 is given greater weight by its history. The culture of secrecy at Stafford Hospital exacerbated the fiasco, and drew Francis' wrath. The duty of candour carries more weight than other regulations. The CQC are tentative about their enforcement agenda due to the newness of the provision, so there is 28 scope for providers to lead the way in compliance policies. Any credible attempt to comply will contribute to the CQC's understanding of how the regulation should be applied and enforced. For providers with clear views on how this should work, there is a strong incentive to work on their institution's approach early. An argument often made is that apology rules can help to reduce the amount of litigation brought, since patients will be satisfied with an apology and an assurance that this event will not happen again. 112 If this is the case, then this is another incentive in favour of having a robust policy favouring openness and apology. Balanced against this is the potential reputational damage coming from taking responsibility for poor practice outside the official complaints procedure or court proceedings. A high number of apologies might make it necessary to scrutinise institutional practices. Alternatively, the reputational damage associated with non-compliance might be more damaging than that linked to a review of practice. Arguably, the expressive influence of the duty of candour has the potential to be more successful than the food provisions in spite of its lack of significant enforcement activity, because the norms in favour of compliance outweigh any competing motivation not to. The CQC has a raft of available enforcement measures. 114 Figure 2 shows an enforcement pyramid illustrating the full range. There is no requirement to start at the bottom of the pyramid and work up. They may start at any level. Inspectors consider two questions, 1) whether the impact of the concern is minor, moderate or major, and 2) whether the likelihood of the events happening again is remote, possible or probable. 115 The answers are combined to decide whether concerns are low, medium, high or extreme seriousness, and help choose the appropriate enforcement mechanism. A minor impact and a remote chance of repeat is low seriousness, and for managing ongoing relationships between the regulatee and the regulator, especially when breaches are not predictable. In the healthcare environment, the focus should be on correcting problems and creating a more stable approach for the future. 119 The next failure is the bigger concern for patient safety. It is difficult to predict the next failure, especially where it falls outside the existing regulations. It is essential that institutions can disclose concerns to the CQC without fear of heavy handed prosecution, so that action may be taken to address potential future breaches. Compliance approaches to enforcement can help to foster this sort of openness.
Properly tailoring enforcement actions to each institution requires an understanding of why regulatees comply. Baldwin's taxonomy of regulatees indicates that different enforcement approaches will suit different regulatees. For example, the wellintentioned and ill-informed regulatee is best dealt with through an educational and supportive approach, whereas the ill-intentioned and ill-informed regulatee is more likely to respond to a legalistic approach supported by the threat of the full weight of the law. 120 Allowing inspectors to tailor their enforcement approach to the type of regulatee is fundamental to the Regulations' success. 121 In the NHS context there is 118 C Diver, 'A theory of regulatory enforcement ' (1980) Regulations. While the framework in the 2014 Regulations clearly permits a compliance approach to enforcement -making it easier to move between levels in the pyramid, and allowing inspectors to start at any point on the pyramid -the tenor of the provisions is that stricter enforcement practices are necessary to prevent The ideal approach to enforcement is a mix between deterrence and compliance.
There needs to be enough of a background threat of prosecution that regulatees feel bound to comply and to work collaboratively with the regulator, but also such that there is a reduced capacity for the regulatory capture. It is possible that the CQC's explicit focus on safety enables them to achieve this balance without compromising their ability to follow a compliance approach to enforcement. Safety is within the purview of the Health and Safety Executive ("HSE"). 134 Since the CQC has responsibility for inspection and managing any ongoing relationship with its regulated providers, there is not the same impetus for the HSE to maintain an ongoing relationship. The HSE does not need to take a compliance approach. They can afford to bring prosecutions as a first rather than last resort. By aligning their priorities with the HSE, the CQC give themselves the freedom to follow a compliance approach to enforcement while relying on the threat of HSE prosecution to focus regulatees on meeting the standards. If the CQC's compliance approach does fail, the HSE provides a safety net to prosecute where there are significant safety failings. that which would endanger the health and life of the patients. They are unlikely to address the problem that food across the sector is generally poor and unappetizing since this would not have an impact significant enough to be caught by the regulations. Further, since the penalties are so stringent for failure to meet these standards, enforcement activity will only take place in the most serious of cases. This makes it unlikely that the food provisions can raise standards. The duty of candour regulations point to potential failure due to over-regulation. Its purpose was to embed transparency and openness in institutional approaches to errors and serious incidents. If the implementation of the duty transfers the burden to individual staff members it becomes a de facto individual duty to apologise, which inappropriately over-regulates individual behaviour, while deemphasising institutions. The focus becomes whether the individual healthcare professional was correct to apologise, and whether they have had training, rather than whether the institution has taken responsibility.
[A] Conclusion
The shortcomings of knee-jerk responses to policy fiascos are well known in the The combination of these factors made the deterrence agenda inevitable, whether ideal or not. To make it work, the CQC have to be properly resourced to fulfil that agenda. If they are not, then there will be another serious healthcare crisis, which will necessarily lead to more stringent regulations, which will need further resources, for a restructured regulator. Lodge and Hood's 'tombstone pattern' 147 is perhaps better understood as a tombstone spiral, with ever increasing stringency.
